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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE H. CHRISTENSEN, 
as guardian ad litem for and in behalf 
of JOSEPH CHRISTENSEN, aka 
JOSEPH NORMAN CHRIS-
TENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. 
FINANCIAL SERVICE CO., INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9694 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
Defendant and Appellant seeks rehearing and 
reconsideration of this Court's holding in its decision 
filed January 25, 1963, that the plaintiff and respondent, 
Joseph Christensen, the payee of the note in suit is a 
holder in due course. If the Court on reconsideration 
and rehearing determines that said plaintiff is not a 
holder in due course, the defendant and respondent 
seeks the Court's determination on the merits, (I) 
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whether the evidence supports the trial Court's findings 
that there was sufficient and lawful consideration as 
between the defendant and Norman Christensen who 
induced the note, ( 2) a determination that the defendant 
is entitled to any setoffs it may have proved as against 
Norman Christensen, and ( 3) a determination that such 
setoffs andjor failure of consideration exceed the 
amount of the plaintiff's claim and that the defendant 
is, therefore, entitled to judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the Statement of ~""'acts contained in 
the defendant's original brief herein, or more properly 
by way of clarification of that statement of facts, the 
following: 
The plaintiff Joseph Christensen did not give value 
either to the defendant Financial Service Company, 
Inc., or his father, Norman Christensen, and is a mere 
donee of the note in suit. 
ARGUl\tlENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S DECISION FILED 
HEREIN ON JANUARY 25, 1963, IS IN 
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND RESPONDENT, JOSEPH 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CliRISTENSEN IS A HOLDER IN DUE 
COURSE. 
A. THE RECORD BELOW CLEARLY 
INDICATES THAT JOSEPH CHRISTEN-
SEN, THE PAYEE OF THE NOTE IN 
SUIT, DID NOT GIVE VALUE TO ANY-
ONE FOR THE NOTE BUT IS A MERE 
DONEE. 
The Court has stated in its opinion on page 3: 
"Defendants avermant that Joseph did not 
give value for the note appears to result from a 
misapprehension. Its evidence was calculated to 
show that he did not give value to the defendant 
corporation. It is not essential that he did so. But 
no evidence was adduced to show that Joseph did 
not give value to his father, Norman Chris-
tensen.'' 
At the outset of the trial, the plaintiff, consistent 
with his complaint, proceeded merely to produce the 
note in suit and the proper signatures of the defendant's 
officers, thus relying on the statutory presumption of 
consideration. As the Court correctly indicates, the 
defendant then proceeded with evidence showing that 
the defendant received nothing of value from the plain-
tiff, Joseph Christensen, in exchange for the note. 
( TR. 5.) Thereupon, the plaintiff proceeded to produce 
evidence tending to show that the consideration for the 
issuance of the note in suit was the cancellation of 
alleged antecedent indebtedness of the defendant to 
Norman Christensen. ( TR. 6.) After some discussion 
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and testimony introduced by both sides, the plaintiff 
objected to any further questions by the defendant with 
regard to the defendant's relationship toN orman Chris-
tensen in connection with the alleged debt. At page 28 
of the Transcript the following appears: 
"MR. BROADBENT: You are alleging that 
the consideration for this alleged note came from 
Mr. Christensen [N ormanL 
"MR. PRESTON: That's right." 
Following an adjournment of the trial of the case 
on August 25, 1961, and before the testimony was com-
pleted, the plaintiff submitted a brief to the court and 
mailed a copy to the defendant's attorney on the 5th 
day of September, 1961. On the first page of said brief 
which is a part of the record herein, the plaintiff states: 
"The plaintiff brings this action as the holder 
of a promissory note in his favor for which he 
gave no consideration for (sic) personally . . . " 
After the case was concluded the defendant sub-
mitted its brief (PL. 49 et seq.). Defendant's brief 
. stated on pages 2 and 3: 
"The further uncontroverted evidence of the 
defendant., and the express admission on page one 
of the plaintiff"s brief herein_, established beyond 
question that the plaintiff, Joseph Christensen, 
the alleged payee of the note, neither took 
delivery from any of defendant's authorized 
agents nor himself gave consideration.-'-' (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
This language was quoted and referred to subse-
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quently in the plaintiff's reply brief. It was challenged 
only with regard to the question of delivery, as follows: 
"It is impossible to claim lack of delivery, un-
less they clai1n that either Joseph or his father 
stole the note. Thus, they had to have the note in 
their hands in order to sign the same; so that the 
first quotation is merely a misstatement of the 
facts and of the contents of our previous brief." 
This reply brief of the plaintiff, part of the record 
herein, and before the trial court, further states at 
page 2: 
"Mr. and Mrs. Christensen have been divorced 
with the tie between them being their only child, 
Joseph. One of the most natural instincts in 
human kind as well as in wild animals is the pro-
tection of offspring. The completion of an educa-
tion of Joseph so that he might be self-supporting 
in an honorable manner was the urge that gave 
rise to the note s1ted upon . . ;H (Emphasis 
added.) 
The trial court's finding that the plaintiff is a holder 
in due course was not based upon a finding of the fact, 
or the lack of evidence to the contrary, that Joseph gave 
value to his father or anyone else. At page 432 of the 
Transcript, the court states: 
"In the case of Joseph Christensen vs. Finan-
cial Service Company, the court finds as a fact 
that there was at least sorne consideration which 
ostensibly passed from Norman Christensen to 
the Financial Service Company. I'm not finding 
full consideration; just some. And to that extent 
I find that Joseph is entitled to be clothed with 
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some of the robes of a holder and I direct judg-
ment in his favor against Financial Service Co." 
(Emphasis added.) 
This view of the evidence is also reflected in the 
Court's formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Finding of Fact No. 7 (PL Ill) as follows: 
"That the note was given by the defendant to 
the plaintiff in return for cancellation of indebt-
edness owed by the defendant corporation to one 
Norman Christensen, the father of the defen-
dant .... " 
Finally, at page 3 of the plaintiff's and respon-
dent's brief before this Court it is again expressly 
admitted that: 
"The record in this case shows that respondent 
did not, from his own pocket give any consider-
ation for the note." 
In view of all of the foregoing, it is submitted that 
the record is abundantly clear that Joseph Christensen 
was a mere donee of the note in suit. To hold otherwise 
is to vitiate the entire theory on which the case was tried 
by both of the parties and to require further evidence 
of facts not in issue between the parties. The presump-
tion indulged by this Court that a payee is presumed to 
be a holder in due course is at best questionable under 
the law, as will appear hereafter. If such a presumption 
exists in the law, it has been dissipated in this case by 
evidence and the express oral and written statements 
by plaintiff's counsel before the trial court. 
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B. THE COUR,T IS IN ERROR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE PAYEE HERE IS 
PRESUMED TO BE OR IS A HOLDER IN 
DUE COURS~~ IN THE ABSENCE OF 
PROOF THAT HE GAVE VALUE. 
It is conceded that there is a division in the authori-
ties as to whether a payee can ever be a holder in due 
course. It is conceded also that better view is probably 
that a payee may be a holder in due course if he other-
wise qualifies. Defendant's initial brief herein and the 
authorities cited are not for the purpose of urging upon 
this Court a contrary view. However, it does not follow 
from the proposition that a payee may be a holder in 
due course that he is presumed to be such. 36 Yale L. J. 
608, Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," relied 
upon by the Court argues expressly to the contrary. 
After a careful section by section analysis of the negoti-
able instruments act and the cases under the act and 
under the common law preceding it, Professor Aigler 
at pages 630-631 concludes: 
"Since by the statute payees are holders, and 
holders are presumptively holders in due course, 
is it to be said that every payee is prima facie a 
holder in due course? It is conceivable that such 
should be the result. But, reading the statute in 
the light of the common law and remembering 
that in a large percentage of transactions the 
instrument in its inception comes to the payee as 
a promisee and not as a purchaser, would it not 
more reasonably be concluded that a payee is not 
entitled to the presumption unless it appears that 
he took by purchase?n 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"After all, whether a payee is a holder in due 
course is a question not susceptible of a categori-
cal answer. In each instance the conclusion should 
depend upon the type of situation presented. 
No doubt~ prima facie~ a payee is not a holder in 
due course because presumptively he took the 
instrument as promisee rather than purchaser. 
But, it always should be open to proof that he 
really acquired the paper in the latter capacity, 
in which event his status may be that of a due 
course holder." (Emphasis added.) 
It is submitted that even where the maker of an 
instrument fails to show by affirmative evidence that 
the payee did not give value to some other person, the 
payee is not automatically a holder in due course. In 
Seaboard Finance Co. v. Miles~ Sons~ Inc.~ 102 C.A.2d 
526,277 P.2d 892 (1951), the defendant drew and made 
a check for the convenience of its subcontractor, Davies, 
which check was made payable to the plaintiff. The 
court held that the presumtion of consideration was suf-
ficiently rebutted by evidence that the drawer was not 
indebted to the payee~ nor obligated to the subcontractor 
to make the payments directly for his convenience and 
had not guaranteed the subcontractors obligation to the 
plaintiff. The court said 227'P2d, at 893. 
" ... and plaintiff, knowing nothing of any-
thing which transpired between defendant and 
Davies [subcontractor] had no reason to expect 
that defendant would make payments due it 
from Davies. It is not contended that defendant 
owed anything to plaintiff, nor ~was it shown that 
plaintiff suffered any loss or detrirnent by reason 
of the stoppage of payment on the check.n (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
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In other words, the plaintiff-payee was held not to 
be a holder in due course since there was no evidence 
that it had given value in the form of some loss or detri-
ment. And all the defendant was required to do was to 
rebut the presumption of consideration between the 
maker and payee. 
Another case in which the plaintiff was the payee of 
a note induced by a third party is Atkinson vs. Ingle-
wood State Bank~ 141 Colo. 436, 348 Pac.2d. 702 
(1960). That case holds by implication that the amount 
of evidence necessary to rebut the alleged presumption 
that the holder of a note is a holder in due course is that 
amount of evidence which would raise a jury question. 
The court stated: 348 Pac.2d at 705: 
"We conclude that there was sufficient evi-
dence of fraud as an inducement to the execution 
of the instrument here so that the question 
whether plaintiff was a holder in due course was 
at issue. Defendant having proved at least a 
prima facie defense, the burden was on the plain-
tiff to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it was a holder in due course. 
" 
"We agree with the defendant's contention 
that the value requirement of Sec. 52 (3) was not 
satisfied. It is undisputed that following receipt 
of the note from Palmer [who induced its execu-
tion], plaintiff credited his account in the amount 
of $823.80. There is not the least suggestion~ 
however~ that Palmer was allowed to draw checks 
against the credit thus extended.~~ (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Thus, where the maker established merely a prima 
facie defense as against the person inducing the instru-
ment~ the payee was put upon his proof to demonstrate 
that he fulfilled all of the requirements of a holder in due 
course. It is submitted in the instant case that the defen-
dant produced a prima facie defense to the note in ques-
tion not only with regard to absence of consideration 
but also at least partial illegality of consideration as 
well as fraud. That the trial court found no fr"aud is not 
to say that such would not have been a jury question 
or that there was not a prima facie defense, shifting the 
burden to the one claiming to be a holder in due course. 
The issue of illegality of the purported considera-
tion between Norman Christensen and the defendant 
was certainly raised before the trial court and was urged 
upon this Court in defendant's original brief. Specif-
ically, the defendant has contended that part of the 
alleged consideration for the note in suite is a claim for 
the payment of illegal dividends, ( 1) not out of sur-
plus, ( 2) while the defendant corporation was insolvent, 
( 3) not formally authorized, and, ( 4) on fictitious cor-
porate indebtedness contrary to the Utah Constitution. 
This vital issue has been passed over by both the trial 
court and this honorable Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In one of the opening paragraphs of his article, 
"Payees as Holders in Due Course," supra, Professor 
Aigler observes, "Only infrequently have Courts given 
10 
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any attention to the background of the problem; they 
have been disposed to seize upon certain language in the 
Act, some of it pointing to one conclusion and some in 
the opposite, or to be content with the adoption of one 
of the two views expressed in two or three conspicuous 
cases decided under the Statute .... " 
It is respectfully contended that it has been ex-
pressly and impliedly admitted throughout the record 
that the plaintiff in this case did not himself give value 
for the note in suit to anyone. However, even if such is 
not the case, the Negotiable Instruments Act does not 
raise a presumption that a payee is a holder in due 
course. It merely permits him to demonstrate that he is. 
It is respectfully suggested that the Court's deci-
sion contains within it hasty extensions of that doctrine, 
which confuse rather than clarify the law. The Court has 
before it the opportunity upon reconsideration and re-
hearing of this matter to reconcile some of the confusion 
that has heretofore existed. 
To deny the respondent the gift contemplated by his 
father is not to deny him the right properly to present 
his father's claim against the appellant. A donee is not 
a holder in due course. Tilley v. Price (Okla. 1954), 267 
P.2d 996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LORIN J. BROADBENT 
1101 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. 
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